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Belief-based Stability in Coalition Formation with Uncertainty (海外版)


作者:
Chi-kong Chan, Ho-fung Leung
定价:
58.00元
ISBN:
978-7-04-031877-7
版面字数:
240.000千字
开本:
暂无
全书页数:
204页
装帧形式:
暂无
重点项目:
暂无
出版时间:
2013-06-19
读者对象:
高等教育
一级分类:
计算机/教育技术类
二级分类:
信息安全专业课程

暂无
  • Chapter 1 Multi-agent Cooperation and Stability
    • 1.1 Semi-competitive Multi-agent Systems
      • 1.1.1 Characteristics of Multi-agent Systems
      • 1.1.2 Two Basic Solution Concepts of Coalition Formations
    • 1.2 Coalition Formation and Game Theory
      • 1.2.1 Transferable Utility Games
      • 1.2.2 Non-transferable Utility Games
    • 1.3 Problem with the Common Knowledge Assumption
    • References
  • Chapter 2 Non-transferable Utility Games and Coalition Formation Mechanisms
    • 2.1 Non-transferable Utility Cooperative Games
    • 2.2 Transferable Utility Cooperative Games
    • 2.3 Coalition Formation Mechanisms
    • 2.4 Belief and Uncertainties
    • References
  • Chapter 3 Two Classes of Stability-- Strong Core and Weak Core
    • 3.1 Coalition Formation and Stability
    • 3.2 An Example
    • 3.3 NTU Games with Internal Uncertainty
    • 3.4 Opinions and Preferences of Agents
    • 3.5 The Strong Core and the Weak Core
    • 3.6 Effect of Refinedness of Agent Opinions
    • 3.7 Application Areas
    • 3.8 Summary
    • References
  • Chapter 4 The b-Core: Belief-based Coalition Stability
    • 4.1 Games Without Common Knowledge
    • 4.2 Belief-based Coalitional Games
    • 4.3 NTU Games with Private Beliefs
    • 4.4 The Core, the b-Core and Belief Accuracy
    • 4.5 Discussion
    • 4.6 On Dynamic Beliefs
    • 4.7 Summary
    • References
  • Chapter 5 Example Application of the b-Core:Buyer Coalition Problem with Beliefs
    • 5.1 Buyer Coalition Problems
      • 5.1.1 Are the Utility Really Transferable?
      • 5.1.2 How About Stability?
      • 5.1.3 Private Information in Buyer Coalition
      • 5.1.4 Existing Approaches
      • 5.1.5 A New Approach
    • 5.2 Background of Buyer Coalition Problem
      • 5.2.1 Unit Price Schedule and Agent Preference
      • 5.2.2 Agent Beliefs
      • 5.2.3 NTU Buyer Coalition Games
      • 5.2.4 Properties of the b-Core in NTU-Buyer Games
      • 5.2.5 On Mechanism Design
    • 5.3 A Distributed Mechanism
      • 5.3.1 Distributed Non-transferable Utility Coalition Formation Mechanism
      • 5.3.2 An Example of the Mechanism
    • 5.4 Experiment
      • 5.4.1 Performance of the Mechanism
      • 5.4.2 Evidence of Incentive Compatibility
    • 5.5 Summary
    • References
  • Chapter 6 The Complete Picture: sb-Core and wb-Core
    • 6.1 Uncertain Opinion and Private Beliefs
    • 6.2 An Illustrating Example
    • 6.3 NTU-BU Games
      • 6.3.1 Preferences and Beliefs in NTU-BU Games
      • 6.3.2 NTU-BU Games Stability
    • 6.4 Properties
      • 6.4.1 Relationships of the Four Criteria
      • 6.4.2 Effect of Refinedness
      • 6.4.3 Effect of Accuracy
    • 6.5 Summary
    • References
  • Chapter 7 Conclusion
    • 7.1 New Solution Concepts for Belief-based NTU Games
    • 7.2 The Future
    • References
  • Book References
  • Index

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