联盟的稳定性是联盟博弈中一个重要的概念。传统的联盟博弈理论是假设每一个代理人的偏好都是公开的，但是在实际应用中，不少软件代理人的应用系统并不符合这个前提，他们往往是拥有私人信念的个体，因此他们不是按照全体代理人拥有的共同信念来行动的。针对以上问题，本书对传统的稳定性概念中的“核”概念进行扩充，提出一套新的概念，分析带有不确定性并且以信念为基础的联盟的稳定性，并展示这套新概念如何应用于一类新的联盟博弈——以信念为本位的联盟博弈。
本书可供人工智能和计算机科学领域的研究生、工程师以及研究人员参考。
- Front Matter
- Chapter 1 Multi-agent Cooperation and Stability
- 1.1 Semi-competitive Multi-agent Systems
- 1.2 Coalition Formation and Game Theory
- 1.3 Problem with the Common Knowledge Assumption
- References
- Chapter 2 Non-transferable Utility Games andCoalition Formation Mechanisms
- 2.1 Non-transferable Utility Cooperative Games
- 2.2 Transferable Utility Cooperative Games
- 2.3 Coalition Formation Mechanisms
- 2.4 Belief and Uncertainties
- References
- Chapter 3 Two Classes of Stability— Strong Core and Weak Core
- 3.1 Coalition Formation and Stability
- 3.2 An Example
- 3.3 NTU Games with Internal Uncertainty
- 3.4 Opinions and Preferences of Agents
- 3.5 The Strong Core and the Weak Core
- 3.6 Effect of Refinedness of Agent Opinions
- 3.7 Application Areas
- 3.8 Summary
- References
- Chapter 4 The b-Core: Belief-based CoalitionStability
- 4.1 Games Without Common Knowledge
- 4.2 Belief-based Coalitional Games
- 4.3 NTU Games with Private Beliefs
- 4.4 The Core, the b-Core and Belief Accuracy
- 4.5 Discussion
- 4.6 On Dynamic Beliefs
- 4.7 Summary
- References
- Chapter 5 Example Application of the b-Core:Buyer Coalition Problem with Beliefs
- 5.1 Buyer Coalition Problems
- 5.2 Background of Buyer Coalition Problem
- 5.3 A Distributed Mechanism
- 5.4 Experiment
- 5.5 Summary
- References
- Chapter 6 The Complete Picture: sb-Core andwb-Core
- 6.1 Uncertain Opinion and Private Beliefs
- 6.2 An Illustrating Example
- 6.3 NTU-BU Games
- 6.4 Properties
- 6.5 Summary
- References
- Chapter 7 Conclusion
- 7.1 New Solution Concepts for Belief-based NTU Games
- 7.2 The Future
- References
- Book References
- Index
