图书信息
图书目录
Belief-based Stability in Coalition Formation with Uncertainty （海外版）
暂无简介
作者：
Chi-kong Chan, Ho-fung Leung
定价：
58.00 元
出版时间：
2013-06-19
ISBN：
978-7-04-031877-7
物料号：
31877-A0
读者对象：
高等教育
一级分类：
计算机/教育技术类
二级分类：
信息安全专业课程
重点项目：
暂无
版面字数：
240千字
开本：
暂无
装帧形式：
暂无
页数：
204
最新印次时间：
暂无
- 目录
- Chapter 1 Multi-agent Cooperation and Stability
- 1.1 Semi-competitive Multi-agent Systems
- 1.1.1 Characteristics of Multi-agent Systems
- 1.1.2 Two Basic Solution Concepts of Coalition Formations
- 1.1.1 Characteristics of Multi-agent Systems
- 1.2 Coalition Formation and Game Theory
- 1.2.1 Transferable Utility Games
- 1.2.2 Non-transferable Utility Games
- 1.2.1 Transferable Utility Games
- 1.3 Problem with the Common Knowledge Assumption
- References
- 1.1 Semi-competitive Multi-agent Systems
- Chapter 2 Non-transferable Utility Games and Coalition Formation Mechanisms
- 2.1 Non-transferable Utility Cooperative Games
- 2.2 Transferable Utility Cooperative Games
- 2.3 Coalition Formation Mechanisms
- 2.4 Belief and Uncertainties
- References
- 2.1 Non-transferable Utility Cooperative Games
- Chapter 3 Two Classes of Stability-- Strong Core and Weak Core
- 3.1 Coalition Formation and Stability
- 3.2 An Example
- 3.3 NTU Games with Internal Uncertainty
- 3.4 Opinions and Preferences of Agents
- 3.5 The Strong Core and the Weak Core
- 3.6 Effect of Refinedness of Agent Opinions
- 3.7 Application Areas
- 3.8 Summary
- References
- 3.1 Coalition Formation and Stability
- Chapter 4 The b-Core： Belief-based Coalition Stability
- 4.1 Games Without Common Knowledge
- 4.2 Belief-based Coalitional Games
- 4.3 NTU Games with Private Beliefs
- 4.4 The Core， the b-Core and Belief Accuracy
- 4.5 Discussion
- 4.6 On Dynamic Beliefs
- 4.7 Summary
- References
- 4.1 Games Without Common Knowledge
- Chapter 5 Example Application of the b-Core：Buyer Coalition Problem with Beliefs
- 5.1 Buyer Coalition Problems
- 5.1.1 Are the Utility Really Transferable？
- 5.1.2 How About Stability？
- 5.1.3 Private Information in Buyer Coalition
- 5.1.4 Existing Approaches
- 5.1.5 A New Approach
- 5.1.1 Are the Utility Really Transferable？
- 5.2 Background of Buyer Coalition Problem
- 5.2.1 Unit Price Schedule and Agent Preference
- 5.2.2 Agent Beliefs
- 5.2.3 NTU Buyer Coalition Games
- 5.2.4 Properties of the b-Core in NTU-Buyer Games
- 5.2.5 On Mechanism Design
- 5.2.1 Unit Price Schedule and Agent Preference
- 5.3 A Distributed Mechanism
- 5.3.1 Distributed Non-transferable Utility Coalition Formation Mechanism
- 5.3.2 An Example of the Mechanism
- 5.3.1 Distributed Non-transferable Utility Coalition Formation Mechanism
- 5.4 Experiment
- 5.4.1 Performance of the Mechanism
- 5.4.2 Evidence of Incentive Compatibility
- 5.4.1 Performance of the Mechanism
- 5.5 Summary
- References
- 5.1 Buyer Coalition Problems
- Chapter 6 The Complete Picture： sb-Core and wb-Core
- 6.1 Uncertain Opinion and Private Beliefs
- 6.2 An Illustrating Example
- 6.3 NTU-BU Games
- 6.3.1 Preferences and Beliefs in NTU-BU Games
- 6.3.2 NTU-BU Games Stability
- 6.3.1 Preferences and Beliefs in NTU-BU Games
- 6.4 Properties
- 6.4.1 Relationships of the Four Criteria
- 6.4.2 Effect of Refinedness
- 6.4.3 Effect of Accuracy
- 6.4.1 Relationships of the Four Criteria
- 6.5 Summary
- References
- 6.1 Uncertain Opinion and Private Beliefs
- Chapter 7 Conclusion
- 7.1 New Solution Concepts for Belief-based NTU Games
- 7.2 The Future
- References
- 7.1 New Solution Concepts for Belief-based NTU Games
- Book References
- Index
- Chapter 1 Multi-agent Cooperation and Stability
